Alternative models for moment inequalities by Ariel Pakes
   


































































The Institute for Fiscal Studies 
Department of Economics, UCL 
 
cemmap working paper CWP21/10 Alternative Models for Moment Inequalities.
A. Pakes,
(Harvard University and the National Bureau of Economic Research.)
July 6, 2010.
Abstract
Behavioral choice models generate inequalities which, when combined with addi-
tional assumptions, can be used as a basis for estimation. This paper considers two
sets of such assumptions and uses them in two empirical examples. The second exam-
ple examines the structure of payments resulting from the upstream interactions in a
vertical market. We then mimic the empirical setting for this example in a numerical
analysis which computes actual equilibria, examines how their characteristics vary with
the market setting, and compares them to the empirical results. The nal section uses
the numerical results in a Monte Carlo analysis of the robustness of the two approaches
to estimation to their underlying assumptions.
This is a revised version of part of my Fisher-Schultz Lecture presented at the World Congress of the
Econometric Society in London, August 2005. The paper draws extensively from past interactions with my
students and coauthors, and I would like to take this opportunity to express both my intellectual debt and
my thanks to them. I like to think they enjoyed the experience as much as I did, though that might have
been harder for the students in the group. For help on this paper I owe a particular debt to Robin Lee. I
also thank three referees and the editor, Daron Acemoglu, for their helpful comments.
1Behavioral choice models generate inequalities which, when combined with additional
assumptions, can be used as a basis for estimation. This paper considers two sets of as-
sumptions which suce and uses them in two examples which have been dicult to analyze
empirically. In doing so we distinguish between the assumptions needed to estimate the
\structural" parameters dened by the primitives of the choice problem and the \reduced
form" coecients obtained from regressing prots on variables of interest.
I begin with a single agent discrete choice problem; a consumer's decision of which su-
permarket to shop at. This provides a transparent setting to illustrate the assumptions
underlying alternative estimators and motivates the more formal discussion in the rest of
the paper. The diculty in analyzing this example arises from the size of its choice set;
all possible bundles of goods at \nearby" locations. Its importance stems from the need to
analyze similar problems to understand the implications of alternative local policies (zoning
laws, public transportation alternatives and the like).
Section 2 of the paper formalizes two sets of assumptions that take one from the choice
model to an estimation algorithm. This is done in a multiple agent setting (with the single
agent simplications noted). The rst approach is labeled the generalized discrete choice
approach as it generalizes familiar discrete choice theory to allow for multiple interacting
agents. The ideas behind this approach date to Tamer (2003), and are developed in more
detail in papers by Ciliberto and Tamer (2007) and Andrews, Berry and Jia (2007). It was
rst considered in the context of analyzing two stage entry games, but is easily adapted to
other multiple agent problems.
The second approach is based upon the inequalities generated by the dierence between
the expected prots from the choice made and those from an alternative feasible choice; so
we refer to it as the \prot inequality" approach. It is preceded by the rst order (or Euler)
condition estimators for single agent dynamic models provided in Hansen and Singleton
(1984) and extended to incorporate transaction costs, and hence inequalities, by Luttmer
(1996). The approach considered here is a direct extension of the work in Pakes, Porter,
Ho and Ishii (2007) who provide assumptions that enable us to take \revealed preference"
inequalities to data (for related work on revealed preference in demand analysis, see Varian,
1982, and in the analysis of auctions, see Haile and Tamer, 1996). The two approaches are
2not nested and a comparison of their assumptions closes this section.
Section 3 applies the frameworks developed in Section 2 to the analysis of markets in
which a small number of sellers interact with a small number of buyers. This is typical of
upstream interactions in many vertical markets; markets where sellers re-market the goods
they buy to consumers. A diculty in analyzing them is that the contracts that establish the
buyers' costs are typically proprietary, and these costs determine both the prices the buyer
charges to consumers and the sellers' investment incentives. Costs are also often proprietary
in consumer goods markets. However because there are many consumers in those markets
we typically assume a Nash in price (or quantity) equilibrium in them. Then the rst order
conditions from that equilibrium can be used to back out marginal cost. The analogous
procedure for vertical markets leads us to moment inequalities: we observe who contracts
with whom and ask what features must the buyer's cost functions have for each agent to be
doing better under the observed set of contracts than what they could have expected from
changing their contracting behavior.
The section begins by extending the empirical work of Ho(2009 ) which characterizes
cost functions in HMO-hospital networks. It shows that her approach can be extended to
allow for disturbances that are known to the agents when they make their decisions but not
to the econometrician. It then compares the empirical results she obtains to those obtained
once we allow for these disturbances. Next we compute equilibria for markets similar to
those used in the empirical analysis. The numerical results allow us to both investigate the
consistency of the empirical results with those obtained from an equilibrium computation,
and to engage in a more general examination of the correlates of equilibrium markups.
Section 4 uses the data underlying the numerical results of Section 3 in a Monte Carlo
analysis of the two approaches to estimation introduced in Section 2. It focuses on the
behavior of the two estimators when one or more of the assumptions needed to derive their
properties is violated. At least in our example the estimators were robust to all assumptions
but that on form of the disturbance distribution required only for the generalized discrete
choice model1.
1Since the theoretical restrictions brought to data are moment inequalities, they typically lead to set
valued estimators. Methods of inference for set valued estimators are an active and important area of
31 A Motivating Example.
I begin with a single agent example taken from an unpublished thesis by Michael Katz
(2007; I thank him for permission to use it). Katz's goal was to estimate the costs shoppers
assign to driving to supermarkets. Transportation costs are central to understanding store
location decisions and hence to the analysis of the impact of regulations (e.g. zoning laws)
and policy changes (e.g. public transportation projects) on retail trade. They have been
dicult to analyze empirically with traditional discrete choice models because of the size and
complexity of the choice set facing consumers (all possible bundles of goods at all \nearby"
stores). In contrast large choice sets facilitate moment inequality estimators, as they give
the empirical researcher a greater ability to chose a counterfactual that is likely to isolate
the eect of interest (here the cost of travel time).
Assume that the agents' utility functions are additively separable functions of the utility
from the basket of goods the agent buys, expenditure on that basket, and drive time to the
supermarket. The agent's decision, say di, consists of buying a basket of goods, say bi, at
a particular store, say si, so di = (bi;si). If zi represents individual characteristics, U(bi;zi)
and dt(si;zi) provides individual i0s utility from bi and drive time to si, respectively, and
e(bi;si) is the expenditure required to buy bi at si, then the agent's utility from (bi;si) is
(di;zi;) = U(bi;zi)   e(bi;si)   idt(si;zi); (1)
where I have normalized the coecient on expenditure to one so i, the dis-utility of a unit
of drive time, is in dollars.
To proceed using moment inequalities we need to compare the utility from the choice
the individual made to the utility from a choice the individual could have made but chose
not to. This is a sample design question as it determines what variance is used to estimate
the parameter. For a particular di we chose the alternative, say d0(di), to be the purchase
of; (i) the same basket of goods, (ii) at a store which is further away from the consumer's
home then the store the consumer shopped at. Note that, given the additive separability
assumption, this choice dierences out the impact of the basket of goods chosen on utility;
econometric research that I do not discuss here; see, in particular, Chernozhukov, Hong and Tamer (2006),
Andrews and Soares (2010), and the papers cited above.
4i.e. it allows us to hold xed the dimension of the choice that is not of direct interest and
investigate the impact of travel time in isolation.
Assume the agent makes its choice of store by maximizing its expected utility (equation
1) conditional on the information at its disposal when it chooses the store to shop at. We
denote the agent's expectation operator by E() and its information set by Ji. Note that
when the agent makes this choice the goods that will be bought at the store are a random
variable, say b, as are their prices and hence total expenditure e(). If the bundle bought
at the chosen store could have been bought at the alternate store then (s0;b0
i), where b0
i
is what would have been bought had the agent gone to s0, is preferred over (s0
i;bi). Since
si was preferred over s0
i, transitivity of preferences insures that if, for any function f() ,

























and consider two dierent assumptions on the distribution of the i.
Case 1. Assume i = 0, or more generally, that all determinants of the costs of drive time
are observed and incorporated in the econometrician's specication. Letting !P denote












!p   0: (2)
To obtain an upper bound for 0 consider an alternative store (s00
i) which was closer to











!p   0: (3)
I.e. provided the average of the expectational errors converge to zero, equations (2) and (3)
give us asymptotic bounds for 0.
5Case 2. Now assume that there is a determinant of the cost of drive time that the agent
knows but is not observed by the econometrician, i.e. i = (0 +2;i); where
P
2;i  0 , so





























!P   0:
(4)
An analogous upper bound to 0 is generated by choosing an alternative whose drive time
is less then that of the chosen store.
Discussion. Case 1 uses a ratio of averages to bound the parameter of interest while case
2 uses the average of a ratio. The following points should be kept in mind.
Case 1 vs. Case 2. Case 2 allows for unobserved heterogeneity in the coecient of interest
and does not need to specify what the distribution of that unobservable is. In particular the
unobservable can be freely correlated with the right hand side variable. \Drive time" is a
choice variable, so we might expect it to be correlated with the perceived costs of that time
(with 2;i). If it is then Case 1 and Case 2 estimators should be dierent, otherwise they
should be the same. So there is a test for whether any unobserved dierences in preferences
are correlated with the \independent" variable, and that test does not require us to specify
a conditional distribution for 2;i. Similar issues arise in analyzing the choice of a durable
good when there is an intensity of use decision that follows the choice of the durable (for a
classic example see Dubin and McFadden,1984).
Behavioral Conditions. This is a \two-stage" model with uncertainty; an initial choice
of where to shop is made before knowing what prices are, and a choice of what to buy is
made after arriving at the store. Note, however, that we did not have to specify either the
information on prices the agent had at its disposal when it made its initial decision, or
the form of the agent's prior price distribution conditional on that information. These are
objects econometricians seldom have access to.
6Conditions on the Choice Set. All we required of the choice set was one feasible alter-
native. In particular we did not need to specify and compute returns for the many possible
\inside" choices and we did not need to specify an \outside" alternative.
Finally note that our focus on the drive time coecient lead us to chose an alternative
that dierenced out any heterogeneity in preferences over bundles of goods. If instead we
were interested in the utility of a particular good we would compare baskets with and without
that good at the same store. If we had multiple observations on the same individual there
are many more (largely unexplored) possibilities.
1.1 Estimates from the Inequality and A Comparison Model.
Katz (2007) estimates his model using the Nielsen Homescan Panel, 2004, for household
expenditures and data from Retail Site Database of TradeDimensions for the characteristics
of stores. He uses the shopping trips of about 1,300 families in Massachusetts and surrounding
counties, and compares the results that use inequalities to the results that he obtains from
estimating a discrete choice comparison model.
The Comparison Model. To obtain the econometric implications of a behavioral model
of supermarket choice we would (i) specify the agent's prior distribution of prices at each
store, (ii) compute the bundle of goods the agent would buy for each possible realization of
the price vector at the store and (iii) form the expected utility of going to the store. These
are demanding tasks. Similar considerations lead most (though not all, see below) analysis
of single agent discrete choice problems to reduced forms. The reduced form can be given
an appealing interpretation by constructing it from the regressions of expected returns from
each choice on variables of interest. If we then make a suciently powerful assumptions on
the joint distribution of the regressions function disturbances, the functions themselves can
be estimated. It is the fact that an analogous reduced form is not useful in multiple agent
problems that lead to the generalized discrete choice model considered below.
Unfortunately this reduced form can not be used in the supermarket choice problem
without rst reducing the dimension of the choice set. Katz assumes the number of weekly
visits made to supermarkets is distributed as a Poisson random variable. At each visit the
7consumer chooses between ten expenditure bundles at each of the outlets within a given
radius of its home. The utility function for a given expenditure bundle and store is allowed
to dier with the number of shopping trips per week, but for a xed number of trips is
given by equation (1) augmented with an additive \logit" error. The expenditure bundles
are constructed from typical purchase patterns for a given amount of expenditure which are
then priced at each outlet (giving us the expenditure level for each choice)2.
There are a number of reasons to doubt the estimates from this model. I focus on those
directly related to the price and drive time variables. First the prices for the expenditure
class need not reect the prices of the goods the individual actually is interested in. So
there is an error in the price variable and if the individual shops at stores where the goods
they are interested in are less costly, that error is negatively correlated with the price itself.
Second the model does not allow for expectational errors. So agents are assumed to know all
relevant prices when store choice decisions were made (and there are a lot of them). Finally
the model does not allow for unobserved heterogeneity in the aversion to drive time. One
could allow for a random coecient on drive time and integrate it out but this would require
an assumption on the conditional distribution for that variable, and given that the aversion
to drive time is likely to be related to drive time per se, a traditional random coecient
assumption would be suspect.
Results. The specications used for the models estimated were quite detailed; the compar-
ison model estimated about forty dierent parameters for each of three dierent number of
visits per week, while the revealed choice model estimated about fteen. Both models were
estimated with specications that included outlet characteristics and interactions between
expenditure and demographics; so the aversion to drive time varied with observed individual
characteristics. Like the original paper I focus on the estimates of the median (of the mean)
aversion to drive time.
The multinomial comparison models were estimated using maximum likelihood. The
median aversion to drive time was estimated at two hundred and forty dollars per hour. The
2For a discussion of alternative ways of building reduced forms for supermarket discrete choice problems
and an application; see Beckert et. al.,2009.
8median wage in the region was seventeen dollars an hour, so this estimate is implausibly
high. Also several of the other coecients had the \wrong" sign.
The inequality estimators were obtained from dierences between the chosen store and
four dierent counterfactual store choices (chosen to reect price and distance dierences
with the chosen store). Each comparison was interacted with positive functions of twenty
six \instruments" (variables that were assumed to be mean independent of the expectational
errors), producing over a hundred moment inequalities. As is not unusual for problems with
many more inequalities than bounds to estimate, the inequality estimation routine generated
point (rather than interval) estimates for the coecients of interest (there was no value of
the parameter vector that satised all of the moment inequalities). However tests indicated
that one could accept the null that this result was due to sampling error.3
The inequality estimators that corresponded to case 1 above, i.e. those that did not allow
for unobserved heterogeneity in the drive time coecient, produced median aversions to drive
time of about four dollars per hour. The estimators that corresponded to case 2 above, the
case that did allow for heterogeneity in the drive time coecient, generated estimates of
the median aversion to drive time that varied between sixteen to eighteen dollars per hour,
depending on the specication. The dierence between the two estimators is consistent with
their being unobserved heterogeneity in the drive time coecient that is negatively correlated
with drive time itself; a result one would expect from a model where drive time itself was a
choice variable. Moreover in the model which allowed for heterogeneity the other coecients
took on values which accorded with intuition.
3The nding that there is no value of the parameter vector that satises all the inequalities is not unusual
in moment inequality problems with many inequalities. Consider the one parameter case. When there are
many moment inequalities there are many upper and lower bounds for that parameter. The estimation
routine forms an interval estimate from the least upper and the greatest lower bound. The approximate
normality of nite sample means implies that in nite samples the least upper bound will have a negative
bias and the greatest lower bound will have a positive bias. So the two can easily cross. The test is a test
of whether such crossings could have been a result of sampling error.
92 Conditions For Moment Inequality Estimators.
This section provides two sets of conditions that can be used to justify moment inequality
estimators in more general (both multiple and single agent) settings. For each of the two
approaches we consider estimation of both the parameters of the underlying behavioral model
and a \reduced form" constructed by regressing expected prots on variables of interest.
Each approach is dened by four assumptions, two of which are common across approaches
and two dier. I begin with the two common assumptions.
2.1 Common Assumptions.
The rst condition is that agents expect their choice to lead to higher returns than alternative
feasible choices. Let () be the prot function, di and d i be the agent's and its competitors'
choices, Di be the choice set, Ji be the agent's information set, and E be the expectation
operator used by the agent to evaluate the implications of its actions. We assume
C1 : supd2DiE[(d;d i;yi;0)jJi]  E[(di = d(Ji);d i;yi;0)jJi];
where yi is any variable (other than the decision variables) which aects the agent's prots,
and the expectation is calculated using the agent's beliefs on the likely values of (d i;yi).
Throughout variables that the decision maker views as random will be boldface while real-
izations of those random variables will be represented by standard typeface.
Three points about C1 are central to what follows. First, there are no restrictions on
either the choice set or the objective function. In particular the objective function need
not be concave in d, D could be discrete (e.g.'s; a choice among bilateral contracts, ordered
choice, :::) or continuous (e.g., the choice of the location and size of a retail outlet), and
when continuous di can be at a corner of the choice set. Second, C1 is a necessary condition
for a best response. As a result, were we to assume a Nash equilibrium C1 will be satised
regardless of the equilibrium selection mechanism. Finally note that C1 is meant to be a
rationality assumption in the sense of Savage (1954); i.e. the agent's choice is optimal with
respect to the agent's beliefs. In itself it does not place any restrictions on the relationship
10of those beliefs to the data generating process. We will need to restrict beliefs to evaluate
estimators, but the restrictions used dier between the two approaches to estimation.
Both approaches require a model capable of predicting what expected prots would be
were the agent to deviate from its observed choice. This is the sense in which both require a
\structural" model. To predict what expected prots would be from a counterfactual choice
we need to model what the agent thinks that yi and d i would be were it to change its own
decision. For example consider a two period model to determine the number of outlets (di)
a retailer builds. Returns from the choice of di will be a function of post entry prices (which
are in yi) and the number of competing outlets (d i). If either of these are likely to change
when di is changed to d0 we need a model of that change in order to construct the rm's
prots from its counterfactual choice. C2 formalizes this requirement.
We say yi and/or d i are endogenous if they change in response to a change in di. zi
will represent a set of exogenous variables, i.e. variables whose distributions do not change
in response to changes in di. Then our second condition is
C2 : yi = y(zi;d;d i;), and d i = d i(d;zi;), and the distribution of zi conditional
on (Ji;di = d) does not depend on d.
In words C2 states that if either yi or d i is endogenous we need a model for its response
to changes in di, and the model must produce a value for the endogenous variable which
depends only on decisions and exogenous variables. The condition that the distribution of
zi does not depend on the agent's choice is what we mean when we say that zi is exogenous.
The restrictiveness of C2 will vary with the problem. In single agent problems prots do
not depend on d i and the agent's decision is typically not thought to eect environmental
conditions so yi is exogenous. Then C2 is unobjectionable. In multiple agent simultaneous
move games d i(d 6= di;zi;) = d i, so there is no need for an explicit model of reactions by
competitors, but yi often contains price and/or quantity variables which are endogenous. If,
in a sequential move game, we want to consider counterfactuals for agents who move early,
we need a model for the responses of the agents that move later (for d i)4.
4Often it is natural to write that model recursively, so that each agent's decision depends on the decisions
of the agents who move prior to it. The fact that we allow for sequential games explains the dierence
11Implications of C1 and C2. Let d0 2 Di and dene
(di;d





Then together C1 and C2 imply the inequality
E[(di;d
0;d i;zi;0)jJi]  0; 8 d
0 2 Di: (5)
To move from (5) to a moment inequality we can use in estimation we need to specify
 a measurement model which determines the relationship between the (;) and (zi;di;d i)
that appear in the theory and the measures of them we use in estimation, and
 the relationship between the expectation operator underlying the agents decisions (our
E()) and the sample moments that the data generating process provides.
These are the two aspects of the problem which dier across the two approaches. We
begin with a measurement model which nests both their assumptions.
2.2 Measurement Model.
Let r(d;d i;zo;) be the prot function specied by the econometrician up to an additively
separable disturbance (so the zo are observed), and dene () to be the dierence between
the prot function the agent responds to and this specication, so that
r(d;d i;z
o
i;)  (d;d i;zi;) + (d;d i;z
o
i;zi;): (6)
The agent's decision is based on E[()jJi]. We observe r() and have constructed  so
that E[r()jJi] = E[()jJi] + E[()jJi]. It follows that
r(d;d i;z
o





between our C2 and Assumption 2 in Pakes et. al., 2006. The buyer-seller network example in the next











Equation (7) expresses the dierence between the researcher's specication of prots
(i.e. r()) and the function the agent bases its decision on (i.e. E[()jJi]) as a sum of
three components; two of which I have grouped together into 1. The grouping was done
because, when evaluated at  = 0, they both are \mean independent" of Ji under the
agent's expectation operator (under E) by construction. 2 does not share this property and
it is this distinction which forces us to keep track of two separate disturbances below. The
relative importance of the two disturbances will dier with the application.
Sources of 1. 1 is a sum of two terms. (d;)   E[(d;)jJi] provides the dierence
between the agent's expectation of prots at the time the agent makes its decision and the
realization of prots. In single agent problems it is solely a result of uncertainty in the
exogenous variables whose realizations help determine returns (in the supermarket example,
the uncertainty in the prices). In multiple agent problems their may also be uncertainty
in d i. In either case to compute the distribution of (d;)   E[(d;)jJi] we would have
to specify the probabilities each agent assigns to dierent outcomes conditional on their
information sets (objects we often know little about). In order to compute the distribution
of 1 in the multiple agent case we would also have to solve for an equilibrium conditional
on all possible realizations of d i. This would both be computationally burdensome and
require an assumption that selects among possible equilibria. The second component of
1, (d;)   E[(d;)jJi] results from either measurement error in observables or from a
specication error in r() that is mean independent of Ji. Note that such a \specication"
error occurs when r() is formed by regressing the true prot function onto variables of
interest to obtain a \reduced form" whose coecients become the focus of investigation.
Sources of 2. 2 is dened to equal that part of prots that the agent can condition on
when it makes its decisions but the econometrician does not include in the specication. So
though it is not known to the econometrician, 2;i 2 Ji, and since di = d(Ji), di will generally
be a function of 2;i. In the supermarket example 2;i has two components; the utility from
13the goods bought (the U(bi;zi) in equation 1) and, in case 2, the dierences between the
individual's and the average drive time coecients (i   0). In multiple agent problems di
might also be a function of 2; i.
Selection. We can now explain the selection problem in behavioral models. Assume that
x is an\instrument" in the sense that E[2jx] = 0, and, in addition, that x 2 J. Then
E[1jx] = E[2jx] = 0:
These expectations do not, however, condition on the decision actually made (our di), and
any moment which depends on the selected choice requires properties of the disturbance
conditional on the di the agent selected. Since di is measurable (Ji), and 1 is mean
independent of any function of J
E[1;i;djx;d] = 0; however E[2;i;djx;d] 6= 0:
As a result the sample average of x and the residuals will typically not be zero when  = 0,
the condition we generally require of an \instrument".
To see why E[2;ijx;d] 6= 0 consider a single agent binary choice problem ( di 2 f0;1g).
Then di = 1 implies
E[(di = 1;d
0 = 0;)jJi] = E[r(di = 1;d
0 = 0;)jJi] + 2;i  0;
where 2;i = 2;i;d=1   2;i;d=0. So for every agent with di = 1
2;i >  E[r(di = 1;d
0 = 0;)jJi]:
If xi is correlated with E[r(di = 1;d0 = 0;)jJi], and if x is used as an instrument it is
likely to be correlated (), then the expectation of 2;i given xi and di = 1 will be not be
zero, regardless of whether E[2;i;d=1jxi] = E[2;i;d=0jxi] = 0. In words if di was selected then
the dierence in the unobservable part of the incremental expected returns to di must have
been greater than the (negative of the) dierence in the observable part of the incremental
returns, and the latter will typically be correlated with our instruments.
142.3 The Generalized Discrete Choice Approach.
The measurement model in equation (7) provides the notation needed to clarify the con-
ditions needed to move from the prot inequalities in equation (5) to sample moments for
our two approaches. Recall that we also need to clarify the relationship between the agent's
perceptions of expected returns and the returns emanating from the data generation process
embedded in those approaches. We begin with the generalized discrete choice approach (the
approach originally developed to handle entry games in the papers by Tamer,2003, Ciliberto
and Tamer, 2007, and Andrews Berry and Jia , 2007).
The multiple agent versions of the generalized discrete choice approach assume
DC3: 8d 2 Di; (d;d i;zi;0) = E[(d;d i;zi;0)jJi];
or that there is no uncertainty in either the exogenous variables (in zi) or in the actions of
the rm's competitors (in d i). Together C1 and DC3 imply that agents never err5.
It is important to note that there are parts of the single agent discrete choice literature
that do allow for uncertainty. These include both the dynamic single agent discrete choice
models that explicitly account for randomness in exogenous variables, and the literature
which uses survey data on expectations in conjunction with choice models to allow for un-
certainty (see Keane and Wolpin, 2009, and Manski, 2004, respectively, and the literature
they cite). However computational diculties and a lack of information on agents' per-
ceptions on the likely behavior of their competitors have made it dicult to use analogous
techniques in multiple agent problems.
DC4 provides the restrictions the generalized discrete choice model places on the mea-
surement model in equation (7).
DC4. 8d 2 Di; r(d;d i;zo
i;) = (d;d i;zi;) + 1;i; for a known (;), and
zi = (f2;i;dgd;zo
i) , with f(2;i;d;2; i;d)gdj zo;zo
 i  F(;); for a known F(;).
5As stated DC3 also rules out the analysis of sequential games in which an agent who moves initially
believes that the decisions of an agent who moves thereafter depends on its initial decision. However with
only notational costs we could allow for a deterministic relationship between a component of d i and (d;z).
15The rst line in DC4 states that there are no decision specic errors in our prot measure
(1;i does not have a d subscript). So if we knew (di;d i;zi;z i) we could construct an exact
measure of prot dierences for each . The second line states that zi has both observed (the
zo
i) and unobserved (the 2;i;d) components and provides their properties. The distribution
of the unobserved conditional on the observed components are known up to a parameter
vector6, and there is no measurement error in the observed components. Since DC3 assumes
full information all the 2;i;d are known to all agents when decisions are made, just not
to the econometrician. Note that given DC3 the distribution F(j) appearing in DC4 is
a distribution of realized values, and hence must be consistent with the data generating
process (more on this below).
Though the assumptions used in DC3 and DC4 may seem restrictive, they clearly ad-
vanced the study of discrete choice models in multiple agent settings. Recall that single agent
discrete choice models can always be given an intuitive reduced form interpretation. Simply
regress expected returns from alternate decisions onto observed variables and the decision
itself, then solve for the optimal d conditional on the observables and the disturbances from
the regressions, and nally make an assumption on the joint distribution of those distur-
bances that enables identication. The analogous reduced form for multiple agent problems
proved not to be useful. In multiple agent contexts researchers were interested in the re-
lationship between prots and (d i;z) conditional on unobservable determinants of prots,
particularly those that were correlated with d i. For example in the entry models that stim-
ulated this literature there was a focus on the relationship of protability to the number of
entrants. Models which did not allow for unobserved market characteristics that aected the
protability of all potential entrants in a market often estimated coecients that implied
that a rm's prots increased in the number of competitors (since more protable markets
attracted more entrants). So to provide a \reduced form" of interest for the relationship
between prots and (zi;di;d i) we needed to allow for a disturbance that was correlated
with d i. This is the problem the generalized discrete choice approach sought to solve.
6There are papers in the single agent discrete choice literature which have allowed for classication errors
in d; see for example Hausman and Scott Morton, 1998. At least in principal such errors could be added to
any of the models considered here.
16Substituting DC3 and DC4 into the model generated by C1 and C2 (equation 5) and
letting 2;i  f2;i;dgd, with analogous notation for 2; i, we obtain
Model D : 8d
0 2 Di; (di;d
0;d i;z
o
i;2;i;0)  0; (2;i;2; i)jzo
i ;zo
 i  F(;0): (8)
To insure that there exists a  for which the event (di;d0;d i;zo
i;2;i;)  0; has positive
probability 8d 2 Di and all agents in each market, we need further conditions on F() and/or
(). The additional restriction typically imposed is that the prot function is additively
separable in the unobserved determinants of prots, that is
RD





i;0) + 2;i;d; (9)
and the distribution 2;i;d conditional on 2; i has full support [8(i;d)]7.
Keep in mind that the additive separability in equation (9) can not be obtained deni-
tionally. If we did observe realized prots and regressed it on (di;d i;zo
i) we would get a
residual, but that residual is not the 2;i in equation (9). The regression residuals are mean
independent of (di;d i), while 2;i is not. So for the specication in equation (9) to be correct
as() and 2;i have to be derived from the primitives of the problem.





j;dj) across the population of markets, which
we denote by P(). The data consist of random draws on (2;j;zo
j;dj) from P(). The
expectations of any function g() of a draw conditional on x will be given by E[g()jx] =
R
g()dP(jx), so E() is dened by the data generating process (the DGP). The distribution
of 2;j conditional on zo
j in DC4, or F(;), is assumed to be consistent with this DGP.
The model's conditions can be satised by multiple vectors of dj for any value of 
(i.e., there can be multiple equilibria). As a result there is not a one to one map between
observables unobservables and parameters on the one hand, and outcomes for the decision
variables on the other; so the model is not detailed enough to deliver a likelihood. However
Cliberto and Tamer (2006) and Andrews Berry and Jia (2004) note that we can check
7Allowing for additional unobservables, for example unobservables random coecients on the zo
i , would
increase the notational burden but would not change our ability to obtain any of the results below.
17whether the model's conditions are satised at the observed dj for any j and , and this,
together with F(;), enable us to calculate conditional probabilities of satisfying those
conditions. Since these are necessary conditions for observing the choices made when  = 0
the probability of satisfying them must be greater then the probability of actually observing
dj. In addition if we checked whether the dj are the only values of the decision variables
to satisfy the necessary conditions for each 2;j at that  we could construct the probability
that dj is the unique equilibrium. That probability must be lower than the true probability
of observing dj at  = 0. These are inequalities that not all values of  will satisfy, and as
a result they can be used as a basis for inference.
More formally dene the probability that the model in equation (8) (with a restriction
like that in equation 9) is satised at a particular dj given zo
j for a given  to be
Prfdj j z
o
j;g  Prf2;j : dj satisfy equation (8)j z
o
j;g;
and the analogous lower bound to be
Prfdj j z
o
j;g  Prf2;j : only dj satisfy equation (8)j z
o
j;g:
Letting Ifg be the indicator function which takes the value one if the condition inside the
brackets is satised and zero elsewhere, the true probability (determined in part by the
equilibrium selection mechanism) is
Prfdj j z
o
j;0g  E[Ifd = djg j z
o
j]:
Since do not know the selection mechanism we do not know Prfdj j zo
j;0g, but we do know
that when  = 0
Prfdj j z
o
j;0g  Prfdj j z
o
j;0g  Prfdj j z
o
j;0g:
Let h() be a function which only takes on positive values and !P denote convergence






























18which is non-negative at  = 0. An analogous moment condition can be constructed
from Prfdjjzo
j;0g Prfdj jzo
j;g. The estimation routine constructs unbiased estimates of
(Pr(j);Pr(j)), substitutes them for the true values of the probability bounds into these
moments, and then accepts values of  for which the moment inequalities are satised8.
Since typically neither the upper nor the lower bound are analytic function of  simulation
is used to obtain unbiased estimates of them. The simulation procedure is straightforward,
though often computationally burdensome. Take pseudo random draws from a standardized
version of F() as dened in DC4, and for each random draw check the necessary conditions
for an equilibrium, i.e. the conditions in equation (8), at the observed (di;d i). Estimate
Pr(di;d ij) by the fraction of random draws that satisfy those conditions at that . Next
check if there is another value of (d;d i) 2 Di  D i that satisfy the equilibrium conditions
at that  and estimate Pr(di;d ij) by the fraction of the draws for which (di;d i) is the only
such value. If we were analyzing markets with N interactive agents each of which had #D
possible choices and used ns simulation draws on f2;igN
i=1, then for each market and each 
evaluated in the estimation routine we need to evaluate up to ns  #D  N inequalities to
obtain estimates of Prf jg, and we need to evaluate up to ns  (#D)N inequalities if we
also estimated Pr(j). This can be computationally expensive, particularly in multistage
games solved by backward recursions as then to solve for each (di;d i;) we need to compute
equilibria to later stages of the game.
2.4 Prot Inequalities.
An earlier version of this approach appears in Pakes, Porter, Ho, and Ishii (2006). Recall
that what we need is an assumption on the relationship between; (i) the agents' perceptions
of expected returns and the returns emanating from the data generating process and (ii) the
prot measure the agent uses and the one the econometrician species.
8As noted by a referee this routine ignores information. If we can enumerate all possible equilibria, as is
assumed if we use the lower bound, we could use the fact that the equilibrium selection probabilities must
sum to one (for more detail see Beresteanu and Molinari, 2008). Also, I have implicitly assumed that there
is an equilibrium in pure strategies for each point evaluated. This need not be the case; for a discussion of
the implications of existence problems for econometric work on discrete games see Bajari,et.al.,(2006).
19From equation (5), E[(;0)jJi]  0 which implies E[(;0)jxi]  0 if xi 2 Ji. PC3
relates these expectations to averages from the data generating process (our E() operator).



















PC3 nests DC3 as it allows for uncertainty, and it does so without requiring us to fully
specify how the agent forms its expectations. If agents know (i) the other agents' strate-
gies, i.e. d i(J i), and (ii) the joint distribution of other agents' information sets and the
primitives sources of uncertainty (i.e. of (J i;zi) conditional on Ji), then, provided all
expectations exist, our optimality condition (C1) insures that PC3 is satised. These as-
sumptions are, however, stronger than are needed for PC3. Several authors have noted that
agents' expectations can satisfy C1 without them having such detailed information (see for
e.g. Dekel, Fudenberg, and Levine,1999). Further, though correct expectations about prot















where again E() is dened by the DGP. If agents have incorrect expectations on (;0)
but their expectational error is not systematically related to xi (i.e. are mean independent of
xi), then (11) is satised with equality. Indeed PC3 is satised even if agents are incorrect on
average, provided they are overly optimistic about the relative protability of their choices.
The nal condition used in this estimation strategy is designed to deal with the selection
problem caused by the f2;i;j;dg for the i = 1;:::;Nj agents in market j. C1, C2, and the
denitions in equation (7) imply that our model generates the restriction that
E[(;0)jJ] = E[r(;0)jJ]   2  0:
PC3 insures that this implies that if x 2 J sample averages of (;0)h(x) = r(;0)h(x) 
2h(x) have positive expectation. For consistency we require that the sample average of
20the observable r(;)h(x) have positive expectation at  = 0. This will be the case if the
expectation of the average of 2h(x) is non-negative. Above we stressed that even if x is an
instrument in the sense that f2;dg is mean independent of x in the population at large, the
mean of 2;d conditional on x for those who made particular decisions will typically depend
on x. Pakes et al (2006) present a general condition which insures that the selection resulting
from conditioning on agents choices does not impact the consistency of our estimators. Here
I consider three ways of forming moments that satisfy that condition that I have seen used,
often in combination, in applied work. They are based on the researcher nding weighted
averages of dierences between actual and counterfactual choices that either; (i) dierence
out the eect of the 2, (ii) insure that we average over the 2 of every agent (so that there
is no selection), or (iii) sum to an observable which controls for a weighted average of the 2.
PC4a: Dierencing. Let there be G groups of observations indexed by g, counterfactuals
d0
i;g 2 Di;g, and positive weights wi;g 2 Ji;g, such that
P
i2g wi;g2;i;g;di;g;d0
i;g = 0; i.e. a



















i;g;;0) obeys a law of large numbers.
Our case 1 supermarket example is a special case of PC4a with ng = wi;g = 1. There
di = (bi;si), () = U(bi;zi)   e(bi;si)   0dt(si;zi) and 2;i;d  U(bi;zi). If we measure
expenditures up to a 1;i;d error, r() =  e(bi;si)   0dt(si;zi) + 2;i;d + 1;i;d. We chose a
counterfactual with b0
i = bi, so r() = () + 1;, and the utility from the bundle of
good bought is dierenced out. \Matching estimators", i.e. estimators based on dierences
in outcomes of matched observations, implicitly assume PC4a (no dierences in unobservable
determinants of the choices made by matched observations). For other single agent examples
see Pakes et. al.(2006).
For a multiple agent example consider two period entry games with common unobservable
determinants of market protability; the problem that stimulated the literature on using
inequality estimators in multiple agent settings. For specicity consider two retailers, say
i = fW;Tg, deciding whether to enter dierent markets, so di
j = f1;0g and di
j = 1 indicates
21the rm i enters market j = [1;:::;J]. If there are market specic unobservables known to
the agents but not to the econometrician then rj(di;j;d i;j;zi;) = E[j(di;j;d i;j;zi;)jJi]+
2;j + 1;i;j. The zi include sources of cost dierences (like warehouse and central oce







only puts weight on markets where the two agents make opposite decisions.
The only possible counterfactual is d
i;0
j = [1   di
j]. So if wj = 1 and dW
j = 1; dT
j = 0,
rW
j () = E[W
j ()jJW]+2;j +1;W;j, and rT
j () = E[T
j ()jJT] 2;j +1;T;j. Since 2:j























which will be non-negative at  = 0:
Notice that since we assume wi;j 2 Ji;j, these weights imply d i;j 2 Ji;j, as in the
generalized discrete choice model, but we do not require assumptions on the distribution of
zi or of i;. Also more moment inequalities can be generated from appropriate instruments
and the model can be enriched to explicitly allow for dierences in the rm's responses to
the market specic shock (replace 2;j by zi
j2;j, where zi
j  0 and zi
j 2 Ji, and then divide
each dierence by zi
j). Similar structures appear in a number of other familiar problems (e.g.
social interaction models where the interaction eects are additive and group specic).
In simultaneous move games where the market allocation mechanism is known one can
often construct counterfactuals which dierence out individual specic (rather than group
specic) 2 eects. For e.g. in electricity auctions with known allocation mechanisms we
can compute the dierence between the revenues and quantities actually allocated to the
agent and those the agent would have obtained had the agent submitted a dierent bid
(holding the realizations of environmental variables and competitors' bids constant). Prots
are revenues minus xed and variable costs. The fact that the expectation of the dierence
in prots from the two bids should be positive allows us to bound the variable cost function
without restricting agent-specic xed costs in any way (as they are dierenced out).
22PC4b: Unconditional Averages and Instrumental Variables. Assume that 8d 2





i;;)jJi] + 2;i + 1;i;;













1;i;h(xi) and N 1 P
2;ih(xi) obey laws of large numbers. PC4b assumes
there is a counterfactual which gives us an inequality that is additive in 2 no matter the
decision the agent made. Then we can form averages which do not condition on d, and hence
do not have a selection problems. This form of PC4b suces for the examples in this section
but the next section requires a more general form given in the footnote below.9
Case 2 of our supermarket example had two 2 components; a decision specic utility
from the goods bought, 2;i;d = U(bi;zi) (like in case 1), and an agent specic aversion to
drive time, i = 0 +2;i. As in case 1, taking d0 = (bi;s0
i) dierenced out the U(bi;zi). Then
r() =  e(;si;s0
i)   (0 + 2;i)dt(si;s0
i;zi) + 1;. Divide by dt(si;s0
i;zi)  0. Then
C1 and C2 imply that E[e(si;s0
i;bi)=dt(si;s0
i;zi)jJi]   (0 + 2;i)  0. This inequality
is; (i) linear in 2;i, and (ii) is available for every agent. So if E[2] = 0, PC3 and a law
of large numbers insures N 1 P




i;zi) !P 0  0;
while if E[2jx] = 0 we can use x to form instruments. Notice that 2;i can be correlated
with dt(zi;si) so this procedure enables us to analyze discrete choice models when a random
coecient aecting tastes for a characteristic is correlated with the characteristics chosen.
For a multiple agent example of PC4b we look at within market expansion decisions.
Agents chose a number of outlets, a di 2 Z+ (the integers) to maximize expected prots.
Formally the model is a multiple agent two period ordered choice model; a model with many
9The more general version is as follows. Assume G groups of observations with ng members in
group g, and that for each fdi;g 2 Di;ggi there is a counterfactual fd0
i;g 2 Di;ggi and positive weights








i;g;;0)jJi;g] + 2;g + 1;i;g

;













 0, provided laws of large numbers hold.
23IO applications (e.g. Ishii, forthcoming). In the rst period the agents chose a number of
outlets and in the second they obtain the variable prots from sales at those outlets. So
i() = vp(di;d i;)   (c0 + 2;i)di where vp() are variable prots and (c0 + 2;i) represent
the costs of building and maintaining the outlets. These costs dier across rms in ways
known to the rms but not to the econometrician, and c0 is dened to be their average
(so
P
2;i  0). We measure variable prots up to a 1() measurement error, so dene
ri() = i() + 1;di = vpi()   codi + 2;idi + 1;di, where vpi() and di are observed.
C1 and C2 imply that the incremental prots from choosing one more machine than was
actually chosen (a d0
i = di+1) are expected to be less than its cost, or E[(di;di+1;)jJi] 






r(di;di + 1;) !P N
 1 X
i
(di;di + 1;) = N
 1 X
i
[vp(di;di + 1;)   c0]  0;
where we have assumed PC3 and a law of large numbers. I.e. N 1 P
i[r(di;di + 1;) !P
c0  c0. An upper bound for c0 can be obtained by choosing d0
i  di (see Pakes et.al, 2006,
for the case where some observations are at di = 0, in which case the counterfactual d0
i < di is
infeasible). Additional moments can be obtained by forming covariances with h(xi) that are
(unconditionally) uncorrelated with 2;i . Notice that E[v2h(x)] = 0 is our only assumption;
in particular we do not require d i 2 Ji as in our previous multiple agent example.
PC4c: Control Functions. Often variables that are not available at a disaggregated level
are available as aggregates, and this can be used to develop a control function for 2. Two
familiar examples are; (i) rm level exports to dierent countries are typically unavailable but
aggregate trade ows by product and country of destination are recorded, and (ii) product
level input, cost, and sales data of multiproduct rms are not typically available, but both
rm level aggregates over products, and product level aggregates over rms, often are. We
illustrate with a rm location application adapted from de Loecker et. al (in process) that
uses the trade data. An alternative illustration would have been to use the available data on
multiproduct rms in conjunction with the product level aggregates over rms, to analyze
multiproduct cost functions.
The output of each rm at each location is known, but where that output is sold is not.
24The xed costs of rm i in location d are, f(zi;d;), while its marginal costs m(zi;d;) (both
vary with location of production and rm characteristics). Let qi;d be the quantity rm i
produces, and qi;e = qe + e
2;i be the quantity it exports to market e. Here qe is average
exports to e so
P
i e
2;i  0 (8e). c(d;e) is the transportation costs (which vary with the
location of production, d, and consumption,e). We observe qi;d and zi and measure the rm's
total cost up to a 1 error, or r() where









Each rm producing in d chose its location to minimize expected costs and each could have
produced in counterfactual location d0 without changing the countries it sold to. Summing
the expected cost dierence in moving all rms from d to d0, letting Qe be (the observed)
























at  = 0, which allows us to combine the micro data on rms costs and aggregate data on
exports to bound the parameters of interest. Notice that we do so without having to either
estimate demand functions or make a pricing assumption in each country.
2.5 Comparing the Two Approaches.
The two approaches dier in their informational (DC3 vs PC3), and their measurement,
(DC4 vs PC4) assumptions. They also dier in their computational properties but these
are discussed in the context of the Monte Carlo example in section 4.
PC3 nests DC3. PC3 allows for uncertainty and does so without having to specify either
the agents' information sets or their subjective probability distributions conditional on those
information sets; objects we typically know little about. It also allows for expectational
errors provided they are mean independent of the instruments. DC3 assumes agents know
the returns from every choice and correctly optimize. Partly as a result DC3's primary use
in multiple agent settings has been as a characterization of \rest points" of environments
which are \stable" over time; a setting often invoked to justify the use of two period games
25to structure cross sectional empirical work. Notice that even in this setting the the combi-
nation of DC3 with DC4 only leads to consistent bounds if the prot (or value) function
is constructed from correctly specied primitives. If instead a reduced form from regressing
prots on variables of interest is used, the model contain a regression error. This violates the
assumptions of the generalized discrete choice model and will lead to inconsistent estimates
of the bounds on the reduced form parameters. We show how to adapt the discrete choice
model to accommodate reduced forms below.
The two measurement assumptions (PC4 and DC4) are not nested. Indeed the sim-
plest of the measurement assumptions used to justify the two models are distinctly dierent.
Sucient conditions for PC4 are that the f2;i;dg do not vary over d and that there are
instruments which are uncorrelated with the f1;i;dg. DC4 requires that the f1;i;dg do not
vary over d and that there be a known joint distribution for the f2;i;dg. When f2;i;dg does
vary over d then to use the prot inequalities approach we need to control for a selection
problem. Our ability to do so typically depends on the richness of the set of feasible counter-
factual choices, and the appropriate form(s) for the heterogeneity. When f1;i;dg does vary
over d then the generalized discrete choice model will not deliver consistent bounds. f1;i;dg
will vary over d if there is uncertainty about outcomes, measurement error, or specication
error. For some of these cases we can modify the generalized discrete choice model and its
estimation algorithm to deliver consistent bounds.
For a familiar example consider the case where we are analyzing the prots from entering
markets in which the true prot from entering is additively separable in 2, or (di;j =
1;d i;j;zo
i;j;2;i;j) = as(di;j = 1;d i;j;zo
i;j;0) + 2;i;j, as in equation (9), and the prots
from not entering are normalized to zero. As in most entry models, we are interested in
the reduced form obtained by regressing as() onto zo
i;j and the number of competitors, say
P








fdi;j = 1gd + 2;i;j + 1;i;j:
where 1;i;j is the regression error, so E[1;i;jjzo
i;j;
P
ifdi = 1g;2;i;j] = 0 by construction.
Recall that to obtain the inequalities used in estimation in this model we have to check




fdi;j = 1gd + 2;i;j + 1;i;j conditional on d i;j for each i. To do this we will need
an assumption on the joint distribution of the 1;i;j, as well as for the f2;i;jg; and the 1;i;j
must be mean independent of the f2;i;jg, di;j and zi;j, while the f2;i;jg are determinants of
di;j. Given the additional distributional assumption the estimation algorithm is analogous
to that in section 2.3, though a more complex simulator must be used.
It is not as easy to accommodate measurement error in the generalized discrete choice
framework. If zo
i;j = z




ifdi;j = 1gd + 2;i;j;d satises the Nash conditions. To obtain
a simulator that would allow us to do so we would need to draw from the distribution of z
conditional on z0. This is typically not known nor is it easy to estimate. In contrast classical
measurement error does not aect the consistency of the prot inequality estimator.
Finally DC4 requires explicit distributional assumptions on the f2;i;jg, while the prot
inequality model relies only on mean independence assumptions. The need for an explicit
distributional assumption is a concern, as the generalized discrete choice corrects for selection
by nding the probability of 2-values which induce the agent to make particular choices.
Those probabilities depend on the properties of the tail of the 2 distributions; properties we
often know little about. The Monte Carlo example in section 4 is designed to investigate the
robustness of the two models to violations of their assumptions and indicates that it is the
distributional assumption of the generalized discrete choice model that is most problematic.
3 A Multiple Agent Example (Buyer-Seller Networks).
Vertical markets typically contain a small number of both sellers and buyers (who resell the
products they buy to consumers). Most buyers buy from more than one seller while most
sellers sell to more than one buyer. The terms of the payments the buyer makes to the
seller are negotiated and vary with underlying market conditions. These terms determine
both the costs buyers factor into the prices they set when they re-market the goods they
sell to consumers, and the split of the prots between the sellers and the buyers and hence
the sellers' incentives to invest in cost reductions (or product improvements). Unfortunately
those terms are often proprietary; a seller bargaining with many buyers may not want one
27buyer to know the terms of its other contracts.
Costs are also often proprietary in consumer goods markets. However since these are
markets with many purchasers we typically assume sellers have the power to set prices (or
quantities) in them. Then the rst order conditions from a Nash equilibrium can be used to
back out costs; i.e. we can nd the marginal costs that insure that no rm has an incentive to
deviate from the observed prices. This section uses moment inequalities to unravel features
of the payment structure in vertical markets in an analogous way. We observe which sellers
establish contracts with which buyers and, were we to know the buyer's cost function, could
compute approximations to both the buyers and the sellers prots from; (i) the existing
arrangement, and from (ii) a counterfactual in which one of the observed relationships is
changed. So we proceed by parameterizing the buyer's cost function and look for values of
the parameter vector that, on average, make the prots from the observed contracts larger
than those from possible counterfactuals; i.e. values of  that make the observed relationship
in the interests of both agents.
We analyze an HMO/hospital example. To see how market characteristics eect payments
in this example consider two dierent situations. In one a hospital with excess capacity in
a neighborhood with several other similar non-capacity constrained hospitals is bargaining
with an HMO. The HMO has already contracted with other neighborhood hospitals. Since
there are similar options for consumers who require a hospital, the HMO's attractiveness
to consumers is relatively insensitive to the inclusion of the given hospital in its network.
As a result were the HMO to include that hospital it would not, in equilibrium, increase
the premium it charges to consumers. So for the hospital's contract oer to be accepted by
the HMO the contract would have to set hospital prices low enough for the HMO to prefer
sending patients to that particular hospital rather than to its neighbors. On the other hand
if the hospital was the only hospital in the neighborhood the HMO would be unlikely to
attract any customers from that neighborhood without having the hospital in its network.
Then, provided it is in the HMO's interest to operate in the neighborhood, the hospital
should be able to extract nearly all the (hospital related) premiums that would be generated
in that neighborhood.
To use this logic in estimation we will have to specify what the buyer (seller) would have
28expected to happen if it had made a counterfactual choice. This requires assumptions, though
the assumptions need not specify the form of the contracts. We suce with a reduced form
for the payments generated by the contracts obtained by regressing the HMO's per patient
payments on hospital characteristics. In these respects this paper follows the assumptions
used in Ho's (2009) work on HMO/hospital markets. Ho's analysis assumes that there are
no structural disturbances in her data (in our notation, 2;i;d = 2;i;8d). I begin by showing
that, by changing the moment inequalities taken to data, we can develop an estimation
algorithm for her model that allows for both 2 and 1 errors. I then compare the results
from estimators that do, and those that do not, allow for 2 errors. Next full information
equilibria are computed from a structural buyer-seller network game with primitives similar
to those in the empirical example. The reduced form implied by the computed equilibria is
calculated, compared to the estimates obtained from the inequality estimators, and explored
for possible additional correlates of contract characteristics.
3.1 Empirical Analysis.
Ho (2009) uses a two period game to structure the analysis; in the rst period contracts
between HMOs and hospitals are established and in the second period the HMOs engage
in a premium setting game which conditions on those contracts (and is assumed to have a
unique Nash equilibria). Once the premiums are set consumers chose HMO's and, if the
need arises, chose a hospital in their HMO's network.
The premium setting game generates revenues for each HMO conditional on any con-
guration of hospital networks. Let Hm be a vector of dimension equal to the number of
hospitals whose components are either zero or one, a one indicating the hospital is in HMO
m's network and a zero indicating it is not. H m species the networks of the competing
HMOs. The revenues the HMO receives from the premium setting game, say Rm(Hm;H m;z),
and the number of patients HMO m sends to hospital h, say qm;h(Hm;H m;z), depend on these
networks and exogenous variables (our z).
The prots of the HMO are the revenues from the second period game minus the transfers
29the HMO makes to the hospitals in its network in payment for their services, say Tm;h or
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We project Tm;h onto a set of interactions of qm;h() with a vector of hospital characteristics,
say zh, and look for bounds on the resulting reduced form parameters; i.e. if xm;h() = qm;h()
zh are the interactions, we estimate the  in Tm;h(Hm;H m;z) = xm;h(Hm;H m;z)  + m;h;
where m;h are uncorrelated with xm;h by construction. Note that if agents know more about
the details of the contracts they sign than is captured by xm;h(), m;h has a component which
is known to both agents when they make their decisions (a \2" component). Substituting
this form of Tm;h() into the two prot functions we obtain
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h) are either obtained directly from data or from a
careful study of hospital demand and the formation of HMO premiums described in Ho
(2009). We assume that they are correct up to a mean zero measurement error. That is our
measure of prots for HMO m and hospital h given a value for  are
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30Counterfactuals. Equation (12) provides the prots agents obtain from the observed
network. To obtain our moment inequalities we have to consider the prots, and hence the
network, the agents thought would have obtained from counterfactual behavior, and this
requires assumptions on the contracting game. Ho's assumption are both familiar and com-
putationally convenient (we consider a less convenient alternative below). She assumes that
sellers simultaneously make take it or leave it oers to buyers, who then simultaneously ac-
cept or reject. As in Hart and Tirole (1991) the contract oers are assumed to be proprietary:
each HMO knows the oers made to it but not to its competitors, and each hospital knows
the oers it makes but not those of its competitors. We observe which HMOs contracted
with which hospitals and can compute our measures of returns from any network. To form
our moment inequalities we need to know the network that would be established were either
an HMO or a hospital to change its behavior10.
The HMO's act last. So our assumptions imply that the HMO could reverse any of its
decision without changing the behavior of any other agent. Accordingly our HMO counter-
factuals are obtained by reversing the HMO's acceptance/rejection decision with each of the
hospitals in the market, leaving all other contracts unchanged, and computing the dierence
in the HMO's prots between the actual and the counterfactual networks.
To obtain a prot inequality for the hospital we have to; (i) specify an alternative oer
the hospital could make, and (ii) either specify what the hospital thinks the particular HMO
would do were it oered the alternative contract, or compute a lower bound to the prots
the hospital could make as a result of the actions the HMO might take in response to
the alternative contract. We assume that the hospital could always oer a null contract (a
contract which is never accepted). What the hospital thinks the HMO would do if oered this
contract depends on how the hospital thinks receiving the alternative contract would aect
the HMO's beliefs about the contracts oered to other hospitals, and given those beliefs,
whether the hospital thinks the HMO would change its replies to the contracts oered by
10Since we assume that the premium setting game is a full information game, our assumptions are what
McAfee and Schwartz (1994) refer to as \ex poste observability"; the HMO's do not know each other's oer
in the rst period, but the costs in each accepted contract are revealed before the second stage of the game.
This assumption could be relaxed at a cost of increasing the computational burden of estimation.
31other hospitals. We assume \passive beliefs", i.e. the hospital believes that the HMO will
not change its beliefs about the oers the hospital makes to other HMOs were it to receive
the counterfactual oer, and present results which assume that the hospital thinks the HMO
would not change its behavior with other hospitals were it to receive the null contract.
However we have also done the analysis assuming the hospital thinks the HMO might add a
dierent hospital with little dierence in empirical ndings.
Inequalities Used. We began with Ho's assumption that E[m;hjJi] = 0 for i = (m;h).
Then the only disturbances in equations (13) are 1 disturbances, so we can form our in-
equalities by interacting positive functions of variables that were known to the decision maker
when the decision was made with the dierence between our models' estimates of the prots
actually earned and those that would have been generated by our counterfactuals. Recall
that these are the HMO's prots from reversing its decision with each hospital, and hospital's
prots from oering a null contract to an HMO which had accepted its oer.
Next we considered alternative ways of allowing m;h to have a 2 component, i.e. we
allowed E[m;hjJi]  2;m;h 6= 0 and the same value for i = m;h. We rst tried 2;m;h =
2;m; 8(m;h); i.e. that the 2 are HMO specic xed eects. As shown in Appendix 1, we
can then use PC4a to generate a quite detailed set of inequalities. There is no a priori reason
to assume a xed eects structure here and when we did it accentuated the problems with
the 1-only model11. So we used the generalized version of PC4b in footnote 9 to develop an
estimator for the buyer-seller network problem that allows for a 2;m;h of a general form.
Recall that the m;h are a component of transfers, so the same m;h value that goes into
a hospital's revenues is a component of an HMO's costs. Let m;h be the indicator function
for whether a contract is established between m and h with m;h = 1 if it is established
11In the 1 only model about 12% of the inequalities were negative but under 2% were individually
signicant at the 5% level. In the model with xed eects, about a third of the inequalities were negative
and 10% were signicant at the 5% level. A more complete analysis of eects models in buyer-seller networks
would allow for both buyer and seller eects. This is a straightforward, though somewhat tedious, extension
of the results in Appendix 1. We examine the HMO eects case in detail because all the contract correlates we
use in our analysis are hospital specic, and we wanted to make sure that the absence of HMO characteristics
did not bias the analysis of the impacts of these hospital specic variables.
32and zero if not. These are the only two outcomes possible. So to satisfy PC4b we need an
inequality which is additively separable in m;h regardless of whether m;h = 0 or 1.
Let H
h (Mh;Mh=m;M h;z) be the dierence between the hospital's prot when the
network of the hospital includes HMO m and when it does not. If m;h = 1 this contains
m;h. Let M
m (Hm;Hm [ h;H m;z) be the dierence between the HMO's prot were it to
reject hospital h's contract and were it to accept it. If m;h = 0 this includes the savings in
m;h from rejecting the contract. Note that if m;h = 1, E[H
h (Mh;Mh=m;M h;z)jJh]  0,
while if m;h = 0, E[M
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which is additive in 2;m;h regardless of whether m;h is one or zero. So there is no selection











The model also delivers an inequality that does not depend on the m;h (as in PC4a). The
sum of the increments in prots to the HMO and the hospital when a contract is established
does not contain the transfers between them (and hence m;h), does contain information on
 (since if the contract is not established there is a change in transfers to other agents), and
must have positive expectation (at least if contract oers are proprietary). So if Hm=h is the














Estimates. Neither the 1-only nor the model which allowed for 2 could be rejected by
our formal tests. This is not surprising given the sample size12. However the results did
12There were 40 markets containing about 450 plans and 630 hospitals. The market characteristics used as
instruments were indicators for; the quartile of the market's population size, high (greater than mean) share
33seem to favor the model that allows for 2 as only six of the inequalities were negative
at its estimated parameter value (the 1-only model had eleven), and none of them were
individually signicant at the 5% level (in contrast to one for the 1 only model).
The rst four columns of Table 1 present the empirical results. We subtracted our
estimate of hospital costs from the revenues in all specications, so the coecients appearing
in the table are the coecients of the markup implicit in the per patient payment. Despite
the fact that none of the test statistics we computed were signicant at the 5% level, there
was no value of  which satised all the inequality constraints in any specication, a nding
that is not unusual when there are many inequalities (all our specications had eighty-eight
or more of them). The algorithm then generates a point estimate equal to the  value that
minimizes a squared metric in the negative part of the sample moments.
Sample size limited the right hand side variables we could use in the investigation. Still
the estimates we do get, though reduced form, are eye-opening. They imply an equilibrium
conguration in which; the majority of cost savings from low cost hospitals are captured by
the HMOs, and markups increase sharply when a hospital is capacity constrained (CapCon
measures whether the hospital would be capacity constrained if all hospitals contracted with
all HMOs). Though these are not structural estimates they do lead us to worry about the
possibility of signicantly lower incentives for hospitals to invest in either cost savings or in
capacity expansion than would occur in a price-taking equilibrium. The dierence between
the 1  only estimates and those that allow for 2 is that the former imply that almost all
the cost savings from low cost hospitals go to the HMOs, while the latter imply that just
of population aged 55-64, and hospitals integrated into systems. The plan characteristics were indicators for;
whether the plan was local, its quartile of the breast screening distribution, the quality of its mental health
services, and an interaction between the last two variables. The hospital cost measure was not used as an
instrument because we were worried about measurement error in that variable. The results reported here
weighted the market averages of the moment inequalities by the square root of the number of plans in the
market, as this produced slightly smaller condence intervals (interestingly weighting by the variance of the
moment inequalities did not improve those intervals). Condence intervals for each dimension are computing
using the techniques in Pakes et. al (2010; a Monte Carlo study of their properties is available from the
author). Finally Ho (2009) reports a series of robustness checks on the 1 only estimates of a model which
is similar to the model presented here. Though specications which add right hand side variables sometimes
increase the condence intervals quite a bit, the qualitative results in our column (1) are never reversed.
34over 50% do and a larger fraction of prots go to capacity constrained hospitals. Low cost
hospitals tend to be more capacity constrained so the two variables are negatively correlated.
3.2 Numerical Analysis.
Might we expect contracts with these characteristics to emanate from a contracting equilib-
rium and should we interpret those coecients to mean that an increase in the right-hand
side variable would, ceteris paribus, generate the markup response we estimate? To shed
some light on these issues we computed equilibria to a structural contracting model in mar-
kets with characteristics similar to those in Ho's data, but with population scaled down to a
size where we would expect to have two hospitals and two HMOs in each market (this made
it possible to compute equilibria for many markets in a reasonable amount of time).13
We compute a full information Nash equilibrium to a game in which hospitals make take
it or leave it oers to HMOs. The algorithm assumes that both hospitals chose among a
nite set of couples of markups, one for each HMO, and that these markups are oered
simultaneously to the HMOs. The oers are public information, as are the HMO premiums
that would result from any set of contracts (these are obtained as the Nash equilibrium to a
premium setting game among the HMOs). The HMOs then simultaneously accept or reject
the oers. At equilibrium each hospital is making the best oers it can given the oers of
the other hospital and the responses of the HMOs, and each HMO is doing the best it can
do given the actions of its competitor and the oers made by the hospitals14.
13We used a discrete choice model of demand and market characteristics determined by random draws
from demand and cost characteristic distributions that mimicked those in Ho's data. The closest exercise
I know of is in a paper by Gal-Or (1997). By judicious choice of primitives she is able to provide analytic
results from a full information Nash bargaining game between two HMO's and two hospitals. She focuses
on when her assumptions would generate exclusive dealing and its eects on consumers.
14An iterative process with an initial condition in which both hospitals contract with both HMOs chooses
among the equilibria when there are multiple equilibria. The choice set included fty possible markups for
each of the two hospitals. The algorithm starts with the lowest ones. It then determines whether HMO1
wants to reject one (or both) of the contracts conditional on HMO2 being contracted to both hospitals.
This requires solving for equilibrium premiums and prots for HMO1 given each possible choice it can make
and the fact that HMO2 is contracted to both hospitals. HMO2 then computes its optimal responses to
35Note that these assumptions dier from those used in the empirical analysis. In this full
information game the necessary conditions for an equilibrium guarantee an outcome which
is renegotiation proof while the necessary conditions for the asymmetric information game
we took to data do not. The related questions of; (i) when the dierent equilibrium notions
are appropriate, and (ii) whether the estimation results are sensitive to this choice, are
questions that research on buyer-seller networks will have to sort out. Though the contents
of contracts are often proprietary, typically who contracts with whom is not. So if we were
trying to model a set of relationships which have been stable over some time we might only
consider equilibria in which no two agents would nd it protable to recontract given the
information on who is contracting with whom. Of course the market we are studying may
be constantly changing and negotiations might be costly. Then we might not expect the
data to abide by a renegotiation proof criteria, at least not one with costless renegotiation.
Since all we need for estimation is a way of obtaining a lower bound to the expected prots
from a counterfactual choice, we could, at least in principal, obtain our inequalities from
the dierence between the actual prots and the minimum of the prots from a group of
counterfactuals chosen to reect dierent possible game forms (though the larger the group,
the less tight our bounds and the larger the computational burden).
Numerical Results. Column (5) through (8) of Table 1 present OLS estimates from
regressing the computed markups onto variables of interest. The rst two columns show
that the three variables that the empirical study focused on have the appropriate signs, are
signicant, and account for a large fraction, about 70%, of the variation in markups (or about
HMO1's decisions in the same way. This process is repeated until we nd a Nash equilibrium for the HMOs'
responses. No matter the oers, we always found an equilibrium to this subgame. We then optimize over
the rst hospital's (say H1) oers, holding H2's oers xed. For each oer we repeat the process above until
we nd a Nash equilibrium for the HMOs' responses. This gives us H1's optimal oers given the initial oers
by H2. Next H1's oers are held xed and H2 optimize against that. We repeat this process until we nd a
Nash equilibrium in oers. For 3% of the random draws of characteristics we could not nd an equilibria,
and those markets were dropped from the analysis. Note that when a hospital contracts with an HMO in
equilibrium it does not necessarily contract at the lowest oer that is consistent with the HMO accepting.
Dierent oers change the HMO costs per patient. This changes the outcome of the premium setting game
that the HMOs engage in and feeds back into hospital prots.
3685% of the variance in transfers). Columns 7 and 8 add variables. The original three variables
maintain their signs and remain signicant but have noticeably dierent magnitudes; i.e.
though the empirical results do pick up important correlates of the equilibrium payments,
the reduced form parameter estimates should not be thought of as causal responses.
This coecients of the additional variables in column (7) are instructive. They imply that
when the average hospital cost in the market goes up by 1% the markups of the hospitals in
the market go down by .23%, but if the dierence between a hospital's cost and the average
hospital cost goes up by 1%, the hospitals markup goes down by .56%. So a hospital's markup
over costs depends on the costs of the other hospitals it is competing with. Hospitals earn
higher markups in \tighter" markets (markets with lower ratios of population to the number
of hospital beds) and once we account for this the eect of capacity constraints is greatly
reduced (though not eliminated). HMOs seem to get a small quantity discount (the markups
they pay are lower when they send more patients to the hospital), and hospitals earn higher
markups when the HMOs they are dealing with charge their members higher markups.
Finally note that 20% of the variance in markups, or 8% of the variance in transfers,
is not accounted for by our observables. Given the full information assumptions, this is
2 variance. Even in a world where our equilibrium and functional form assumptions are
correct, measurement error in hospital costs would cause 1 error. So in this, and we suspect
in most, empirical examples both types of errors are likely to be present.
4 Specication Errors and Alternative Estimators.
The generalized discrete choice model ignores 1 errors and requires an a priori specication
of the 2 distribution; both assumptions which, if incorrect, can generate an inconsistency
in its estimators. The prot inequality model which pays inadequate attention to possible
sources of 2 error will generate selection biases. This section asks what the impacts of these
specication errors are likely to be in the context of our buyer-seller network example. It
presents Monte Carlo results from using each of the two model's estimators both; (i) when
that models' assumptions are the assumptions generating the data, and (ii) when they are
not. Where possible we will also present results from Ho's data.
37Details of the Monte Carlo Analysis. The Monte Carlo results are based on a popu-
lation of 100,000 markets whose equilibria were computed using the algorithm described in
the last section. We estimate one parameter; the average per patient markup. To obtain
the true value of that parameter we took the transfers implicit in the equilibrium oers and
projected them onto the number of patients and the variables we used as instruments.15 The
function obtained from this projection is treated as the parametric transfer function. The
coecients of the instruments are treated as known and the coecient of the patient variable
is the coecient to be estimated. The residual from this projection is the 2 error. This
insures that 2 has zero covariance with our instruments before we condition on the outcome.
When all we require is a 1 error we treat these 2 as known and add pseudo random draws
on a normal measurement error to hospital costs and/or population size.
The Monte Carlo results are based on four hundred data sets each obtained as indepen-
dent draws from our \population" of markets. The sample size was set so that the number
of contracts in each sample` matched the number of contracts in Ho's (2009) data set. Since
each of the computed equilibria had only two hospitals and two HMO's this gave us a larger
number of markets (1,385 markets per sample), but many fewer contracts per market, than
in Ho (2009). The 1 and 2 draws are taken independently across samples.16
The inequalities used to estimate the prot inequality model are the same as those used in
the empirical work; each HMO reverses its equilibrium decision with each hospital, and each
hospital replaces its equilibrium contract oer to each HMO with a null contract. However
since the Monte Carlo data is generated from a full information Nash equilibrium, when
the hospital oers a null contract to an HMO that hospital considers the prots that would
accrue to it were both HMOs to reoptimize17. For the generalized discrete choice approach
15For accepted oers these were the actual transfers, for the oers that were rejected these are the transfers
that would have resulted if the last oer had been accepted.
16Actually we did the analysis in two ways. In the second we drew a Monte Carlo data set, took two
hundred draws on vectors of 1 errors for that data set, tabulated the results for each data set, and then
averaged over data sets. This provides condence intervals that condition on the observables, while the
results reported in the text do not. The results from the two procedures were virtually identical.
17To obtain the () resulting from the null contract oer, let om;h be the contract oered by hospital h to
HMO m in equilibrium, and  be the null contract. If h = 1 contracted with m = 1, its prots from oering
 are obtained from the HMO equilibrium responses to the tuple (;o1;2;o2;1;o2;2).
38we used the inequalities generated by the necessary conditions for equilibrium.18
Results. Table 2, which presents the results, is split into panels. Panel A provides esti-
mates obtained using the 1-only inequalities, Panel B from using the 2-only inequalities
(the inequalities from the generalized discrete choice model), and Panel C uses the inequal-
ities that allow for both 1 and 2 disturbances. The \true" value of 0 from the simulated
data was 16.76. The \identied set", that is the  interval that satises the population
moment conditions, diers across panels.
Since the instruments are orthogonal to the disturbance by construction, the identied set
for Panel A is the  interval which generates positive population prot inequalities when we
set all disturbances to zero; [13:47;18:59]. The true identied set for the generalized discrete
choice model depends on the true joint distribution of the 2's conditional on the market's
instruments. This is not known and is too complex to estimate non-parameterically; a prob-
lem which is likely to recur in empirical work. To get a sense of the identied set generated
by this approach we set all the disturbances to zero and for each possible network struc-
tures found the set of  which lead to positive values for; (i) the averages of the dierences
between the indicator functions for satisfying the Nash conditions and the \observed" equi-
librium outcome, and (ii) did the same after interacting the dierence in indicator functions
for each network structure with the variables used as instruments. The interval for (i) was
[16:7;16:95], while for (ii) it was [16:7;16:85]; both rather amazingly short.
The rst two rows of Panel A provide results from the 1-only prot inequality model
when there are only 1 errors (so its estimators are consistent). Row 1 adds measurement
error in costs equal to 25% of the true cost variance. The average of the estimated lower
bounds is 8% lower than the true lower bound (0), while that of the upper bound is 2.5%
higher than 0 . Moreover the bounds are precisely estimated, less than 2.5% of the lower
18Note that the estimating equations used do not exhaust the information in the data in either approach.
At the cost of increasing the computational burden we could have; (i) used the inequalities obtained from
simultaneously switching each HMO's behavior with respect to both hospitals in the prot inequality ap-
proach (and if more details on the contracts were available yet other inequalities would become available), and
(ii) for the generalized discrete choice approach we could have computed the probability that the observed
equilibrium was unique.
39(upper) bounds were more than 10% dierent from their true values. When we add an
expectational error to the population, and hence to the patient ows from the HMOs to the
hospitals, the estimated interval gets substantially larger. This is unfair to the model since,
though there may be uncertainty in the relevant population size and patient ows variables
when contracts are signed, we should be able to construct good instruments for them from
current population size and ows, and we did not do that here. We keep this case because
it allows us to examine the impact of specication errors in one setting where the bounds
dene a short interval and one where they do not.
Rows 3 and 4 use a simulated data set that contains both 1 and 2 errors but the
inequalities from the 1-only model. The ratio of the variance in 2 to the variance in the
dependent variable is 12.7%. Now the estimated bounds are inconsistent; the lower bound
will, in the limit, be too large, while the upper bound will be too low. This makes the
bounds move towards 0, but they may overshoot, leaving us with an estimator which does
not cover the true 0. Adding 2 also adds variance to the estimators, so in any nite sample
the estimated bounds may be smaller or larger with 2 errors than without them. In the case
with only measurement error in costs, the case in which the interval was tightly estimated,
adding specication error in the form of the 2 has little eect on any of the estimates.
When there is also measurement error in population and the estimated intervals are larger,
the eect of the specication error is to lessen the loosely estimated upper bound, but only
by 5%. At least in this example estimates from the 1 only inequalities do not change much
when we allowed for 2 error. Apparently when we add 2 variance its biasing eects on the
estimates are largely oset by the eect of increased data variance on those estimates.
The last row of panel A provides the estimates when we use Ho's (2009) data with this
specication. This generates a point estimate about a third lower than the lower bound
estimate from the simulated data and a condence interval of length between that of the
model with errors in the population and that without those errors.
Panel B provides the results when we use the 2-only inequalities. To use the 2-only
algorithm we need an assumption on the joint distribution of the 2. We tried two assump-
tions; (i) random draws from the empirical distribution of the actual 2, and (ii) a normal
distribution. The rst option would not be available to empirical researchers but might be
40closer to the true population distribution (it would be if the 2 were truly independent, not
just mean independent, of the instruments and had no within market correlation).
Regardless of whether we use just the constant term (rows 6 & 7) or all of our instruments
(rows 8 & 9) and regardless of the choice of 2 distribution, the 2-only model generates
point estimates whose values are larger than the true 0. The distribution of estimates had
little variance, so the interval formed from 95% of the point estimates does not cover the true
0 either. Apparently the lack of information on the 2-distribution leads to an inconsistency.
Though this is disturbing the asymptotic bias is not large; the lower bound of the (normal)
condence interval is about 2.6% larger, and the point estimate 6.9% larger, than 0.
Just as we added 2 variance to the algorithm which uses the 1-only inequalities, rows 10
and 11 add 1 variance to the algorithm which uses the 2-only inequalities. The estimates
presented in these rows use the normal distribution of the 2 (an empirical researcher would
not have access to the bootstrap distribution). Adding 1 errors does tend to increase the
parameter estimates further, but by a surprisingly small amount. We could not use the 2-
only algorithms on Ho's actual data. To do so we would have had to compute about 100,000
premium setting equilibria and their implied prots for each 2 draw and each  evaluated
in estimation; a task that will be beyond our computational abilities for some time.
Panel C provides the estimates obtained when we used the inequalities that allow for
both 1 and 2 disturbances; the \robust" inequalities in equations (14) and (15). The
fact that there are only two agents on each side of the simulated markets implies that the
robust inequalities do not deliver an upper bound. The lower bound is lower than the bound
obtained when we used the 1 only inequalities on this data, but not by much. When we
move to Ho's (2009) data and use the robust inequalities we get an estimate which is larger
than the estimate which allows for only 1 errors but a condence interval of similar length,
and both condence intervals cover both estimates. Interestingly once we allow for 2 errors
the estimates from Ho's data is closer to, and the condence interval covers, the value of the
parameter obtained from the numerical analysis.
The results from the Monte Carlo are quite encouraging. It seems that the most salient
problem is the requirement of an assumption on the distribution of 2 in the generalized
discrete choice model. In multistage games that estimator also carries a large computational
41burden. However the worry that a moderate amount of 1 variance in the generalized discrete
choice model, or a moderate amount of 2 variance in the prot inequality model, would
severely bias the estimates is, at least in this example, not warranted. The addition of the
unaccounted for error adds variance, as well as bias, to the estimates. This variance tends
to move the bounds in the opposite direction as does the bias and in our example the net
eect was small. The estimator which uses the robust inequalities is least subject to bias
but does generate larger identied sets.
5 Summary.
This paper formulates two set of assumptions that enable one to bring behavioral models,
both their structural and their reduced forms, to data and applies them to two empirical
problems. Our rst example illustrates that the assumptions underlying traditional discrete
choice estimators are not always the most sensible choice for discrete choice problems. This
motivates an enumeration of assumptions that justify alternative estimators in both mul-
tiple, and single, agent settings. An empirical example illustrated how the multiple agent
estimator can be used to analyze a problem which is central to the determinants of prices and
investment incentives in vertical markets; the correlates of the prot split between buyers
and sellers in those markets. Though the results were reduced form and had to make do with
both limited data and the auxiliary assumptions required to obtain counterfactual prots,
they were broadly consistent with results obtained from a numerical analysis of equilibrium
contracts in markets which were similar to those used in the empirical analysis. A Monte
Carlo analysis indicated that the estimators from both models were surprisingly robust to
all likely sources of problems but one; the need to assume a distribution for the generalized
discrete choice model. It seems that moment inequalities open up possibilities for empirically
analyzing market interactions in relatively unexplored, yet important, settings.
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Appendix: Inequalities for Buyer Seller Network With Fixed Eects.
We use the notation introduced for the hospital HMO problem in subsection 4.1.1, and consider the
case in which the f2;m;hg are HMO xed eects; i.e. that 8(h;m); 2;m;h = 2;m. These restrictions
generate two sets of inequalities.
The rst is a dierence in dierence inequality. If an HMO accepts at least one hospital's
contract and rejects the contract of another, then the sum of the increment in prots from accepting
the contract accepted and rejecting the contract rejected; (i) dierences out the HMO eect and
(ii) has a positive expectation. More formally for every ~ h = 2 Hm and h 2 Hm we have
M
m (Hm;Hm [ ~ h;) + M
m (Hm;Hmnh;) = rM
m (Hm;Hm [ ~ h;) + rM
m (Hm;Hmnh;);








For the second inequality note that if 2;m;h = 2;m we can use the logic leading to equation
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This implies that ES








44Table 1: Determinants of Hospital/HMO Contracts.
Data Real Data Simulated Data
Estimator Inequality Estimators OLS Regression
1 only 1 & 2 Actual Markups
column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
 95% CI  95% CI  s.e.  s.e.
Variable UB/LB UB/LB
Per Patient Markup (Units = $ thousand/patient)
Const. 9.5 15.4/4.8 8.2 15.2/3.3 8.9 .09 3.7 .24
CapCon. 3.5 8.6/1.4 13.5 16.1/2.3 1.2 .10 .48 .11
Cost/Adm. -.95 -1.5/-.57 -.58 -.2/-1.1 -.39 .01 { {
Av.Cost { { { { { { -.23 .01
Cost-AC { { { { { { -.56 .01
Pop/bed { { { { { { .11 .01
# patient { { { { { { -.09 .01
HMOmarg { { { { { { 1.4 .10
R2 { { { { .71 .80
Notes: Real Data. There are 40 markets. CapCon measures whether the hospital would be capacity
constrained if all hospitals contracted with all HMOs, Cost/Adm = hospital cost per admission.
Costs and admissions = 2 IV.
Simulated Data. These are least squares regressions coecients from projecting computed markups
onto the included variables. See below for the calculation of equilibrium markups. There are 1385
markets with 2 HMOs and 2 Hospitals in each. This generates approximately the same number
of buyer-seller pairings as in the data set used in the empirical analysis. Additional variables are
dened as follows; \Cost-AC" is the cost per admission of the hospital minus the average of that
over the hospitals in the market, Pop/bed is population over total number of hospital beds in the
market, # patients is number of patients the HMO sends to the hospital, and HMO margin is the
HMO's average premium minus its average cost.
45Table 2: Inequality Estimators: Simulated and Actual Data.
Disturbances Not In Average 95% of  in
IV LB UB LB UB
A: Using 1 inequalities.
Simulated data: 0=16.76, [0;0]=[13.47,18.59].
Only 1 disturbances
1. 25% Cost Cost 12.39 18.72 12.12 19.05
2. 25% Cost,5% pop Cost, Nj;k,Pop 11.43 37.34 11.30 45.88
1 & 2 disturbances.
3. 2, costs Cost 12.25 18.42 12.01 18.86
4. 2, costs, pop Cost, Nj;k,Pop 11.69 35.91 11.55 43.97
Ho's (2009) data with 1 inequalities.
5. actual disturbances Cost 8.2 8.2 2.3 16.4
B: Using 2 inequalities.
Simulated data, Only Constant as IV: 0=16.76, 00[0;0]00=[16.7,16.95].
6. 2 (bootstrap dist) 17.75 17.75 17.25 18.1
7. 2 (normal dist) 17.92 17.92 17.2 18.45
Simulated data, All IV: 0=16.76, 00[0;0]00=[16.7,16.85].
8. 2 (bootstrap dist) 17.84 17.84 17.40 18.25
9. 2 (normal dist) 18.02 18.02 17.65 18.5
Simulated data, 1 (in costs) & 2 disturbances.
10. 2  N, IV=Only Constant 18.02 18.02 17.35 18.5
11. 2  N, All IV Costs 18.11 18.11 17.64 18.65
Ho's (2009) data with 2 inequalities.
12. Assume 2 normal Could Not Compute.
C: Using Robust inequalities.
Simulated data.
13. 2, costs Cost 11.86 n.b. 11.72 n.b.
14. 2, costs, pop Cost,Nj;k,Pop 11.69 n.b. 11.55 n.b.
Ho's (2009) data.
15. Actual Disturbances Cost 11.7 11.7 3.6 17.9
Notes. Instruments for panels A & C (unless omitted); constant, Nj;k, hospital cost and capacity
measures, market cost capacity and population measures, HMO characteristics, and interactions
among above. Instruments for 2 inequalities are market averages of above variables. The model
for line 15 allowed also for a cost coecient; without it the average markup was negative.
46